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[erim. No. 5758. In Bank. Feb. S, 1956.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. GEORGE H. MARTIN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification For.-The presence of 
two men in 8 parked automobile on a lover's lane at night 
is itself reasonable cause for police investigation, and their 
sudden flight from the officers and the inference therefrom 
that they are guilty of some crime leaves no doubt as to the 
reasonableness and necessity for an investigation, and under 
such circumstances it is reasonable for the officers to order 
the suspects to put their hands in front of them and to get 
out of an automobile to be searched before being questioned. 
[2] Id.-Justification For.-Where officers had reasonRble ground 
to pursue suspects and, on overtaking them, to order them to 
put their hands in front of them, whereupon one officer saw 
a small bag in the front seat of an automobile which had been 
covered by their hands, he had reasonable cause to believe 
that their possession of it prompted their flight and that it 
contained contraband, and was therefore justified in taking 
it from the car. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County and from an order denying a new trial. Donald 
K. Quayle, Judge. JUdgment affirmed; appeal from order 
dismissed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment 
of conviction affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
Kelt. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Searches and Seizures, § L 
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George H. Martin, in pro. per., and Clinton W. White, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant. 
EdmundG. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
one count of possessing marijuana in violation of Health and 
Safety Code, section 11500. He also uppeals from an order 
that he claims was entered denying his motion for a new 
trial. The record, however, does not disclose that a motion 
for a new trial was made or that an order denying it was 
entered. The latter appeal must therefore be dismissed. 
Officers McCann and Price of the Oakland Police Depart-
ment were on automobile patrol duty during the evening of 
July 21, 1954. At about 11 o'clock, while driving in a south-
erly direction on Poplar Street near 21st Street, they observed 
a car parked on the opposite side of the street headed in 
the opposite direction. As they passed the car, Officer 
McCann turned his spotlight on it and saw two men sitting 
in the front seat. He testified: " ... it is a lover's lane. 
If it had been a female and a male I wouldn't have thought 
too much of it but two males in that vicinity I figured we 
had better check it out and as I brought the patrol car around 
to make a U-turn on Poplar Street the suspects' car took 
off. They spun their wheels taking off at a high rate of speed. 
They turned right onto 21st Street and proceeded up 21st 
Street and turned right again on Union Street which would 
put them heading in a southern direction again on Union 
Street and they turned east on 19th Street and all this time 
I had the red light and siren on and I brought the patrol 
car on up there on their left rear and very close and stopped 
them in front of 1181 - 19th Street." Officer McCann ap-. 
pro ached the car from the left, and Officer Price from the 
right, and one of them flashed his flashlight into the car. 
Robert Dial, who later pleaded guilty to the charge of posses-
sion of marijuana, was in the driver's seat. Defendant was 
sitting on the right-hand side of the front seat. Dial's right 
hand and defendant's left hand were on the center of the 
seat. The officers ordered the suspects to put their hands 
in front of them, and when they did so Officer McCann saw 
a small bag in the middle of the front seat that had been 
covered by their hands. The officers ordered the suspects 
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out of the car, and after searching them for weapons Officer 
McCann reached into the car and took the bag. He examined 
it and concluded that it contained marijuana. Later analysis 
confirmed this conclusion. 
Defendant contends that the search of the automobile 
without a warrant was unlawful and that the evidence pro-
duced thereby was therefore inadmissible. 
[1] Although the presence of two men in a parked auto-
mobile on a lover's lane at night was itself reasonable cause 
for police investigation (see People v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645, 
649-651 [290 P.2d 531J; Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App. 
13, 16-17 [98 P. 43J), their sudden flight from the officers 
and the inference that could reasonably be drawn therefrom 
that they were guilty of some crime (United States v. Heitner, 
149 F.2d 105, 107), left no doubt not only as to the reason-
ableness but as to the necessity for an investigation. (Husty 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 [51 S.01. 240, 75 
L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407]; Talley v. United States, 159 
F.2d 703; Levine v; United States, 138 F.2d 627, 628-629; 
Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539, 541.) Under these 
circumstances the officers were justified in taking precau-
tionary measures to assure their own safety on overtaking 
the suspects, and it was therefore reasonable for them to 
order the suspects to put their hands in front of them and 
to get out of the automobile to be searched for weapons before 
being questioned. [2] When Officer McCann saw the bag 
that was uncovered when the suspects removed their hands, 
he had reasonable cause to believe that their possession of it 
prompted the flight and that it contained contraband. He 
was therefore justified in taking it from the automobile. 
(Oarrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 [45 8. Ct. 280, 
69 L.Ed. 543,39 A.L.R. 790] ; Husty v. United States, supra, 
282 U.S. 694, 700·701; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 
255 [59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151] ; Brinegarv. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [69 S.01. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879) ; United 
States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d 
3,7.) 
The judgment is affirmed, and the appeal from an alleged 
order denying a motion for new trial is dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-J diss("nt. 
It appears to me that the following statement from the 
majority opinion is most astounding: "Although the pres-
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ence of two men in a parked automobile on a lover's lane 
at night was itself reasonable cause for police investigation . 
. . . " There are so many perfectly legitimate reasons why 
the car might have been parked with two men as passengers 
and so many logical explanations therefor, that to say the 
very sight of two men in a parked automobile at night war-
rants a police investigation reminds one of the Gestapo. 
Since when has there been a curfew for adults' Since when 
has it been illegal for two men to converse at night in a parked 
automobile' Since the deplorable practice of "buggil1g" 
hotel rooms, private homes and offices and tapping telephone 
lines has become so prevalent, almost the only place two busi-
nessmen, who wish their conversation to remain private, can 
be safe is in an automobile on a sparsely traveled street or 
other secluded place. And. if their mere presence in a parked 
automobile is held to warrant police investigation, it appears 
that private conversations must also be held illegal and the 
right of privacy nonexistent. 
It must be remembered that the Fourth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States was adopted for the 
protection of all of the people of this country, and that 
section 19 of article I of the Constitution of California was 
adopted for the protection of all of the people of this state. 
The object and purpose of the framers of these constitutional 
mandates was to guarantee and make secure the fundamental 
right of privacy to every person-the right to be secure 
against police surveillance unless the police have reasonable 
cause to believe that an offense is being committed. This 
does not mean mere suspicion as some of our courts have 
recently indicated. The obvious reason for the rule that 
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search, cannot 
be used against the victim of the search, is to protect innocent 
people by discouraging such searches. It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that it has been the practice of law enforce-
ment officers of this state to make searches of the persons 
and property of individuals whenever they saw fit regardless 
of whether reasonable or any cause existed, and many inno-
cent people have been subjected to the indignity and humilia-
tion of having their persons, homes, offices and automobiles 
searched by law enforcement officers with impunity when 
nothing of an incriminating nature was found and no arrests 
or prosecutions resulted therefrom. Many of these invasions 
of the constitutional right of privacy received no public 
mention because the victims did not wish to incur the expense 
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and endure the inconvenience and publicity incidental to 
seeking redress in the courts. It is probable that for every 
case where evidence of a crime has been found there have 
been numerous illegal searches which uncovered no evidence 
whatsover, and we know from the reported cases that the 
practice of illegal searches in this state has increased many 
fold in recent years. The American way of life does not 
lend itself to such totalitarian practices. There is no place 
in our body politic for the Gestapo, the storm trooper or the 
commissar. Ours is a system of ordered liberty which is 
made more secure by placing a magistrate between the citizens 
and the overzealous law enforcement officer. While this 
system must protect the guilty as well as the innocent against 
an unlawful search and seizure, its effect on criminal prosecu-
tions in this field is no different than any of the other safe-
guards embraced in the Bill of Rights which are designed 
to protect the life, liberty and property of our people against 
deprivation without due process of law. Each and everyone 
of these safeguards operates as an impediment against the 
conviction of the guilty as well as the innocent. Yet, this 
is necessary in any system of ordered liberty. If the above 
mentioned constitutional provisions have any meaning what-
soever, then the victim of an illegal search may assert the 
right of privacy guaranteed t.o him and resist such search. 
If he does so, either he or the officer may be injured or killed. 
If this should occur, where should the blame fall f Obviously, 
a prosecutor who favors such illegal conduct on the part of 
law enforcement officers would be disposed to prosecute the 
victim of the illegal search if he should injure or kill the 
officer in his effort to resist the search, and would not pros-
ecute the officer who injured or killed the victim in the 
forcible execution of his illegal project. 
From the intemperate and misleading statements appear-
ing in the public press recently as having been made by heads 
of police departments and prosecuting officers of this state 
against the rule in the Cahan ease, we are forced to assume 
that they feel that great credit and high praise should go 
to those law enforcing officers who ruthlessly violate the above 
mentioned constitutional guarantees, and that hatred, con-
tempt, ridicule and obloquy should be heaped upon those 
who insist upon their observance and preservation. I will 
again repeat what I have said many times both as a private 
citizen and as a public official of this state, that I have a 
sincere devotion to the American system for the administra-
tion of justice as postulated by the Constitution of the United 
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States and the Bill of Rights; that I can conceive of no 
emergency short of a threat to our national security which 
would justify striking down any of the safeguards for the 
protection of the rights of the people embraced within that 
system. The impediments against law enforcement, the 
escape of some criminals from conviction and punishment, 
and the cost to the public incidental to the operation of such 
a system, fades into insignificance when we offset and balance 
against those factors the glorious feeling which stems from 
the consciousness that, because of this system, we live in an 
atmosphere where we may enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness with dignity and self-respect, secure against 
any invasion of our fundamental personal rights without 
due process of law. 
The elder Pitt, in his speech on the Excise Tax, gave 
expression to what later became the Fourth Amendment. 
What he said then is just as important today. He said that 
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the 
forces of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the 
winds may blow through it; the storms may enter; the rain 
may enter-but the King of England cannot enter. All his 
forces cannot cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." 
Yet, prior to the decision in the Cahan case, the police and 
other so-called law enforcement officers in California could 
ruthlessly force their way into the home of a private citizen, 
and without a search warrant, seize whatever they found and 
use it as evidence in our courts notwithstanding they violated 
the constitutional right-the right of privacy-of the citizen 
in obtaining it. 
Another great Englishman, Lord Coke, had this to say 
on this same subject: "The house of everyone is to him as his 
castle and fortress, as well for his defense against injury and 
violence as for his repose." 
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his great dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469, 470 [48 8.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 
944, 66 A.L.R. 376], had this to say: "But I think, as Mr. 
Justice Brandeis says, that apart from the Constitution the 
government ought not to use evidence obtained and only ob-
tainable by a criminal act. . . . [W] e must consider the two 
objects of desire, both of which we cannot have and make 
up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals 
should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence 
should be used. It also is desirable that the government 
should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they 
1 
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are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If 
it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime I do 
not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the 
same way, and I can attach no importance to protest.ations of 
disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces 
that in future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, 
and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals 
should escape than that the government shouUl play an 
ignoble part." (Emphasis added.) 
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice 
Traynor, in People v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645, 650 [290 P.2d 
531], where he said: "In the present case the officer searched 
first and asked questions only after his search uncovered the 
incriminating cigarette, and there is nothing to indicate that 
had he confined himself to a reasonable inquiry, he would 
have discovered anything to confirm his suspicion that de-
fendant had no lawful right to be where he was. 
"Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to justify 
a search on the ground that he 'didn't feel' that a person 
on the street at night had any lawful business there would 
expose anyone to having his person searched by any suspicious 
officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions were. Inno-
cent people, going fo or from evening jobs 0'1' entertainmellt, 
or walkillg for exercise or enjoyment, would suffer along with 
the occasional criminal who would be turned up. As pointed 
out by Mr. Justice Jackson in a similar case, 'We meet in this 
case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said that if 
such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement 
will be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, 
after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Con-
stitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating 
police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater 
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals 
from punishment. Taking the law as it has been given to us, 
this arrest and search were beyond the lawful authority of 
those who executed them.' (Ullited States v. Di Re, supra, 
332 U.S. 581, 595 [68 S.Ot. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210].)" (Emphasis 
added.) In Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Ca1.App. 13, 16, 17 [98 P. 
43], the court said: "A police officer has a right to make 
inquiry in a proper manner of anyone upon the public streets 
at a late hour as to his identity and the occasion of his pres-
ence, if the surroundings are such as to indicate to a reasonable 
man that the public safety demands such identification. The 
fact that crimes had recently been committed in that neigh-
/ 
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borhood; that plaintiff at a late hour was found in the 
locality; that he refused to answer proper questions estab-
lishing his identity, were circumstances which should lead a 
reasonable officer to require his presence at ·the station, where 
the sergeant in charge might make more minute and careful 
inquiry." (Emphasis added. ) Here, eyen after the chase, the 
suspects were not questioned-they were ordered to put their 
hands in front of them, and ordered to get out of the car. 
To bolster its theory that the '\"ery sight of the two men 
in a parked car justified a police in'\"estigation, the majority 
relies on their flight from the officers. In United Sfof,es v. 
Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106, the officers involved had been 
ordered by police headquarters to watch a certain building 
where it was suspected a still was being operated. Twomen 
came out of the building and were followed by the officers 
who lost them. They went back to the building and the 
chase, or flight, ensued when the two men returned there. 
It is obvious from a reading of the case that the facts there 
showed more than the presence of two men in a car to warrant 
the search. In Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 [51 
S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407], the facts showed 
that on the day of petitioner's arrest, the officer had re-
ceived information that Rusty had two loads of liquor in 
certain described automobiles which were parked in "par-
ticular places on named streets." The court held that the 
information received prior to the arrest was sufficient to show 
probable cause for the arrest. In the instant case, we have 
only the fact that two men were parked in an automobile at 
night and their flight from the investigating officers to estab-
lish probable cause. In Talley v. United States, 159 F.2d 703, 
the court noted that "there was advance information suffi-
cient in itself to justify the search. But, more than that, 
there was actual evidence of conduct, including flight, trans-
piring in the presence of the officers" to justify their search. 
In Levine v. United States, 138 F.2d 627, there was also ad-
vance, reliable information that the appellant had illegal 
possession of alcohol prior to the search by the officers. In 
Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539, probable cause for the 
search was found to exist because the officers had kept the 
accused premises under surveillance for about three months 
prior thereto. . 
From the summary set forth above of the eases relied on 
by the majority it appears that they are readily distinguish-
able. In all of them there was advance information that 
